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A Third System of the Arts? An Exploration of Some Ideas from
Larry Shiner's The Invention of Art: A Cultural History
  David Clowney 
Abstract
I explore some implications of Larry Shiner’s view that fine art is a
modern invention. In part I, I briefly summarize Shiner’s main thesis and
defend it against some misunderstandings and objections that have
appeared in the literature. In part II, I discuss Shiner’s remarks about
the possible emergence of what he calls a “third system of the arts.” I
ask what such a system might look like, consider some signs that it may
indeed be emerging, and venture a suggestion about what would be
required for it actually to come about.
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1. Larry Shiner’s “Art Divided” Thesis
In The Invention of Art: A Cultural History (cited hereafter as TIA), Larry
Shiner claims that Art with a capital A, Fine Art, was invented in the west
in the eighteenth century. [1] The claim is not original with him; he
credits Paul Oskar Kristeller’s essay “The Modern System of the Arts” [2]
as the inspiration for his work. Others have made this claim as well,
among them Pierre Bourdieu, [3] Paul Mattick, [4] and Terry Eagleton.
[5] What Shiner has added is a detailed proof of the Kristeller claim
using the methods of intellectual, social, cultural, and art history.
In brief, the thesis is this: There was a traditional “system of the arts” in
the West before the eighteenth century. (Other traditional cultures still
have a similar system.) In that system, an artist or artisan was a skilled
maker or practitioner, a work of art was the useful product of skilled
work, and the appreciation of the arts was integrally connected with
their role in the rest of life. “Art,” in other words, meant approximately
the same thing as the Greek word techne, or in English “skill”, a sense
that has survived in phrases like “the art of war,” “the art of love,” and
“the art of medicine.” The usefulness of an art and its products was not
limited to the merely utilitarian or decorative (e.g. , cooking, clothing,
shelter, personal adornment, or warfare), but also included religious
worship, cultural instruction and celebration, memorializing rulers,
marking rites of passage, entertainment, and many other functions that
linked it with intellectual and cultural life. Artisans were often honored in
this older system, depending on the nature of their craft (painting ranked
higher than the writing of plays), and they were certainly able to
express themselves individually and make profound statements through
their work, as Michelangelo and Shakespeare did. Nevertheless they
practiced a craft, and self-expression was limited to the bounds set by
their accountability to their patrons or employers, or in Shakespeare’s
case, by what the theater audience would pay to see (TIA, pp. 47-52).
Thus, in the old system, what we call the crafts (e.g., weaving,
stonemasonry, ceramics) were more highly honored and were taken
more seriously than now, and what we call the arts (theater, painting,
musical composition and performance, dance, etc.) were treated more
like crafts than they are now. Modern ideas of art had not yet developed.
Beauty, in the traditional system, was both highly prized and so strongly
connected with utility that Aquinas thought an artifact could not be
beautiful if unsuited to its ordinary use. He gives the outlandish example
of a glass saw which, he says, could not be beautiful because it would be
useless (Summa Theologica I-II, 57, 3c, cited in TIA , p. 34). Naturally
Aquinas never imagined work like that of contemporary glass artist Rick
Beck, who has made his reputation with enormous, useless and (to my
eye) often quite beautiful cast glass saws, screwdrivers, nuts, bolts and
the like. Beck’s work is an excellent example of the kind of thing that
could never have existed under the traditional system of the arts. To see
some of Beck’s work, follow this link:
www.kentuckyarts.org/Vessels%202003/Rick%20Beck%20Exhibition.htm
What Shiner calls the modern system of the arts came together in the
eighteenth century partly in connection with the development of a
market for art among the growing middle class. In the new system, Fine
Art (art with a capital “A”) was divided from the crafts as the appropriate
object of refined taste, and usefulness became rather a negative than a
positive feature for a work of art. Art for Art’s sake, the Artist as
Visionary Genius, and the unique Aesthetic Attitude/Experience emerged
as the distinguishing features of Fine Art. New institutions devoted to the
arts, such as galleries, museums, concert halls and libraries, were a
central part of the new system. The public had to learn that these were
places where one must be quiet and devote one’s sole attention to the
work. (TIA pp. 143-144) Within the new system, Art was exalted,
acquiring almost a religious significance by the nineteenth century, while
craftwork was devalued and minimized, leaving room for the eventual
emergence in the twentieth century of artists in whose work craft skills
play no important role. Alexander Baumgarten gave the new category of
“the aesthetic” its name in 1738. Kant and Schiller firmed up the
philosophical definition of the aesthetic at the end of the eighteenth
century, Kant famously isolating aesthetic judgment from other sorts of
appreciation of a work or a landscape, and likewise providing an
enduring analysis of the eighteenth century categories of the Beautiful
and the Sublime. Shiner provides a fine review of this crucial passage in
his chapter, “From Taste to the Aesthetic.” (TIA 130 – 151)
In developing and expanding on Kristeller’s thesis, Shiner has chosen to
preserve that author’s reference to a “system of the arts.” The language
may bother some readers. By “system” neither Kristeller nor Shiner
means anything as tight or rigorous as many philosophers have meant
by the word; rather the usage is analogous to that in the term “social
system”. The intent is to indicate the breadth and complexity of the arts
in society, in relation to the rest of social life and culture. [6]
The modern system has some awkwardnesses and some internal
contradictions. In it all Art is assumed to be of a kind, even though in
the traditional system there would be no compelling reason to suppose
that the disparate activities of music, painting, sculpture, architecture,
and poetry (the five original “fine arts) share a common essence, in
contrast with occasional overlaps in respect to form, narrative, imitation,
beauty, etc. Arguably this assumption has directed the development of
these arts (and of the others that have since been added to the group)
in new ways, as well as setting possibly unsolvable challenges to
aestheticians who are trying to define that common essence. Internal
contradictions arise most generally in regard to the relation of the arts to
the rest of life, now that the modern system has forced a partial
separation between the two. For example, while often claiming universal
human relevance and a transcendent mission, contemporary Fine Art in
the modern period has become increasingly inaccessible to most people,
for whom the role claimed by art is often filled by what Clement
Greenberg disparagingly called Kitsch, or by a somewhat nostalgic
attachment to classic works by early moderns like Van Gogh, Cézanne
and Monet that were radical more than a century ago but now feel
comfortable.
In spite of such shortcomings, says Shiner, the modern system of the
arts has remained both powerful and totalizing. Its standards and ideals
have so taken hold of our understanding that we see the arts of the past
and of other cultures through its lenses, and cannot make quick sense of
the claim that it was invented in the eighteenth century. So it is not
surprising that practitioners of the exiled popular arts and the crafts
(furniture makers, potters, popular musicians, movie-makers, graphic
novelists, video-game designers, gourmet chefs, hairdressers, and many
more) regularly try to climb over the wall and be acknowledged as
Artists. It’s the only way to be taken seriously. The system responds by
stretching the wall to assimilate a few of them who are deemed to have
risen to the level of fine art (e.g. , Elsa Schiaparelli from among fashion
designers, as reaffirmed recently by a 2003 show at the Philadelphia
Museum of Art), leaving the rest outside.
There has always been a resistance to the strictures of the modern
system, often focusing on the charge that it separates art from life, and
sometimes attempting to destroy the split between Art and the crafts
(e.g. William Morris, the Bauhaus). Shiner thinks that this resistance is
becoming stronger, and that the assimilationist response to it that I’ve
just described may not be working so well anymore. He ends his book by
speculating about the possible emergence of a third system of the arts.
Is Shiner’s main thesis plausible? A fair evaluation requires attention to
the rich tapestry of historical, cultural and philosophical analysis that he
has woven in The Invention of Art; and I highly recommend such
attention to interested readers. For now, because some readers may not
be familiar with his work and because I have presented it so briefly, I
wish to fend off some misunderstandings that would make his thesis
implausible.
2. Two Objections to Shiner’s Thesis, with Responses.
2a. Objection 1: It is implausible to think that Fine Art was invented in
the eighteenth century West. What about Aeschylus, Praxiteles,
Shakespeare, and Michaelangelo? What about the great art of non-
western cultures, especially that made before those cultures had much
contact with the West?
This is a natural objection to Shiner’s claim, but it rests on a
misunderstanding. He does not say there is nothing in common between
artists or artworks or arts criticism or the experience of art products in
the West before and after the eighteenth century, or between the
modern West and non-Western cultures. [7] He does not imply that
artisans in the old system could not express themselves, or create
profound visions of life and the world. That would not be a defensible
position. Rather Shiner claims that art was divided in the eighteenth
century West. It was this division that made possible the emergence of
Art in the modern sense. So attitudes we now have toward craftwork or
interior decoration, and attitudes we now have toward fine art sculpture,
might both be appropriate toward, say, a piece by Dellarobbia or a
sculpture or salt-cellar by Cellini (TIA p. 38). In many works from the
past we recognize the same formal and substantive characteristics for
which we now prize Fine Art. Shiner’s thesis does not imply that this
must be a misrecognition. He only warns that our perception of these
past greats and their work, as well as our understanding of the practices
and products of other cultures, can be distorted by the controlling power
of the Fine Art paradigm. They do not fit the Fine Art paradigm, and
their works played a significantly different role in their cultures than Fine
Art products play in ours.
Of course, if the differences between the traditional and the modern
systems are too small, if there is too much in common between them,
that would indeed defeat Shiner’s claim. But arguably the differences are
great. Several facts demonstrate this. First, the modern system makes
possible much that is genuinely new and would not be possible without
it. By the late nineteenth century this fact is obvious. Most modernist
work (the music of Schoenberg, the novels of James Joyce, the paintings
of Mondrian, Kandinsky and Jackson Pollack) would be inconceivable
without the development of the Fine Art idea. For such works are valued
as Art, independent of any overt social, economic, religious or practical
function they might have. [8] They demand intensely focused attention
in order to be understood. However conflicted their contemporaneous
relationship to it may be, they depend for their existence on the art
world: on galleries, critics, and art purchasers, i.e., on those who take
art seriously for its own sake and whose cultural identity prepares them
to understand and value such work. Even at this historical remove, the
popularity of most modernist work is limited. At the time of its creation it
was restricted to a tiny cultural circle, and this circle would have been
offended had they been accused of valuing it for any other reason than
as Art.
Second, the distinguishing characteristics of the modern system are
themselves new, and together they create a dramatically new set of
expectations. One of these is the negative value of utility when
considering a work of art. Art is supposed to be made for its own sake,
not for some other purpose. Of course it may serve a purpose; but in the
modern system it only counts as Art if it is valuable on its own
independent of that purpose. Shiner gives a number of examples to
establish that this expectation is indeed new. Likewise, the notion of the
Artist as Creative Genius is significantly altered in the modern system.
Genius itself is a very old idea, a version of the idea of divine inspiration.
But in the modern system the artist is a genius rather than being
inspired by a genius, and what genius generates is not so much
preternatural skill as innovation beyond rules. In other words, genius is
no longer the characteristic of an artisan. The third defining idea, that of
(autonomously) Aesthetic Appreciation, is likewise radically new (TIA,
pp. 130-153, 213-225). Finally, as already mentioned, the Unity of the
Arts is a new thesis, unknown in the past, and it has a major influence
on the practice and theory of art. The grouping of music, painting,
sculpture, poetry, fiction, architecture and dance as Fine Arts has
created the impression that they must share essential characteristic, in
virtue of which they receive this designation.
I take these differences to be sufficient to demarcate the modern from
the traditional system of the arts, while allowing that some work could
be recognized and valued for similar reasons under both systems. The
Kristeller/ Shiner view survives this first objection intact.
2b. Objection 2: Shiner moves improperly from the historical emergence
to the illegitimacy of the category of Fine Art.
In a review of TIA, Paul Barlow faults Shiner for his “…apparent belief
that to point out that concepts and practices have histories is in some
sense to prove that they are mistaken.” [9] But, says Barlow, “neither a
concept’s usefulness nor its truth is determined by how old it is.” For
example, he says, the notion of schizophrenia emerged at a certain time
in the history of psychiatry. But this does not make the notion
illegitimate rather than representing an advance in understanding, nor
does it mean that there were no schizophrenics in previous centuries.
It seems to me that this criticism of Shiner, like the last one, misses the
mark. It is, however, less superficial than it sounds, and deserves a little
attention. The comparison with the supposedly scientific category of
schizophrenia is unfortunate; presumably whatever the development of
the modern Western concept of art represents, it is not a form of
scientific discovery. But Barlow could easily have chosen better
examples. In fact he doesn’t need any examples to invalidate the
principles that “concept C has a history, therefore it must be mistaken,”
and “practice P is of recent origin, therefore it’s artificial and
unfortunate.” These principles are ridiculous. One can be fairly sure in
advance that Shiner does not subscribe to them. Fortunately for the
strength of Barlow’s critique, he goes on to engage Shiner’s actual views
more seriously. Why, he asks, should we bemoan The Great Divide and
view it as a kind of Fall, or think that it might or should in some way be
transcended or mediated? Why not just take it as a development in
cultural history, and if we must place a value on it, why not a positive
one? Likewise, why not use the categories of Art and especially of the
Aesthetic to illuminate our examination of artifacts and practices from
the past and from cultures that have not separated these categories as
we have done?
Shiner has answers to these questions, and to me they seem plausible
ones. First, he does not see the emergence of the modern system
completely or even primarily as a Fall. It is clear that he values much
that the modern system has produced. He does not envision or hope for
the end of such artistic statements, even if they have no “use” (TIA, pp.
303-307). What troubles him are the divisions that the modern system
enshrines, the impoverishment of ordinary life that can result from these
divisions, and the class and gender biases and cultural imperialisms that
the modern system often validates. By his account of the historical
origins of that system he means, at the least, to question those claims
to universal validity that it implicitly makes.
Could one maintain that the categories of the modern Western system of
art are indeed universally valid, in spite of their historical origin? Surely
one could. To do so would be to adopt a strategy similar to that of
Hegel, or perhaps his modern admirer Arthur Danto. It would be to claim
that the concepts and practices of art and the aesthetic as they have
emerged in the modern west are a truer and deeper and more maturely
differentiated form of what was implicit in our human past and in all
human cultures. As is the case with many such emergents, once the
mature practice develops we naturally stand within it to sort out the
confusions of its past. We see it stumbling toward this, in which we now
stand. We see the separation between art, craft, and other skills as part
of this cultural maturation. The by now global reach of the modern
system might be taken as support for such a view.
Should the emergence of the modern system be seen in this way?
Shiner’s reasons for saying “No” are not based on the historical novelty
of that system or merely on a desire to avoid charges of cultural
chauvinism. Rather they are grounded in the modern system’s flaws, its
internal inconsistencies, its inability to maintain the foundational
assumptions on which it rests, the ways in which it clouds our
understanding or appreciation of the artistic values and practices of other
cultures on their own terms, and the separation of art and life in Western
culture for which he holds it partly responsible. If Shiner is right that the
modern system possesses these characteristics, and if they flow, as he
claims, from the historically contingent way in which it divides the arts,
then he has good grounds to question the universal validity of that
system and its assumptions. His thesis survives this second objection as
well.
3. A Third System of the Arts?
Shiner closes his book by speculating about the possible emergence of a
third system of the arts, one in which “the divisions of the fine art
system” might be “transcended through a continuing struggle.” In what
follows I will ask what such a third system might look like, whether there
are any signs that it might be emerging, and finally what conditions
would have to be met for it actually to emerge.
3a. What would a “third system of the arts” look like?
Shiner is wisely hesitant to be too specific about this. Nevertheless one
can see what he hopes for, and frame some questions about whether it
might be possible. I’ll begin by quoting his comments about a third
system in the last two paragraphs of The Invention of Art:
The answer to art divided is obviously not to reject such ideals as
freedom, imagination and creativity but to unite them with facility,
service and function. Yet there is no magic formula for the correct
balance. It would be silly to demand that every piece of music, literature
or visual art manifest an equal dose of imagination and skill, form and
function, spiritual and sensual pleasure. And, rightly understood, there is
a time and place for disinterested attention and formal analysis as well
as for the renewed interest in beauty (Brand 2000; Scarry 2000). In
pluralistic democracies there will probably always be multiple art worlds,
including small coteries who will consider only the most daunting and
esoteric or the most socially and politically shocking works to be “real
art.” But most people will participate in several kinds of art worlds,
moving across the old divisions and hierarchies and juggling more or
less successfully the relationships among art, religion, politics and
everyday life.
. . .
We cannot resurrect the old system of art. Nor can we simply wish away
the break that split apart the old system of art, arrogating intellect,
imagination and grace to fine art and disparaging craft and popular
culture as the realm of mere technique, utility, entertainment, and
profit. Like other dualisms that have plagued our culture, the divisions of
the fine art system can only be transcended through a continuing
struggle. I do believe we transcend them in practice from time to time;
what is harder is naming and articulating what we have done. (TIA, p.
307)
On the basis of this textual evidence, as well as other things Shiner says,
I take it that the “third system” he envisions would at least have the
following characteristics:
a) It would preserve the best of the modern system, i.e. , it would still
value works of creative genius for their own sake, regardless of their
utility, and it would still support the making of such works.
b) The arts would be more integrated with the rest of life than they are
in the fine art system. In the right circumstances, utility, profitability and
popularity would be positively valued within the new system, rather than
being seen as either irrelevant or disqualifying traits. The result might be
an “aesthetic of the everyday,” like that of traditional Japan, which
values the elegant union of form and function. Here is Shiner again, first
summarizing and then quoting Yuriko Saito: “Whereas mainstream
western aesthetics can treat a kitchen knife as if it were a work of art so
long as function is subordinated to form, an aesthetic of the everyday
would attend not only to the knife’s visual appearance but also to its
‘feeling in the hand…its weight, and balance, but most importantly…how
smoothly and effortlessly it cuts’” (TIA, pp. 305-306).
c) Thus popular art and music, craftwork, entertainment and design
would be included as part of this third system. Nothing would be seen as
“not art” merely by virtue of belonging to one of these fields.
d) Finally, the divisions of class, race, and gender which the modern
system incorporates would be significantly overcome.
Is Shiner’s third system possible, and are there any signs that it is
emerging? I will address the second question first. I believe with Shiner
that such signs do exist. Since we are talking about a cultural system,
the existence of such signs does not by itself establish the cultural
possibility that a new system will actually emerge, so I’ll close by briefly
addressing the first question.
3b. Reading the signs
1) Fine Art vs. Popular Art and Entertainment
The Fine Art idea remains extremely powerful, and there are no
indications that it is fading or losing strength. However, it has also
spread in recent years to the point where it plays a powerful role in the
popular arts and in entertainment. One may see this as an extension of
the assimilation strategy that has characterized the modern system
throughout its history. I think that’s correct so far as it goes, but more
needs to be said. First, what is happening is not always assimilation so
much as a transfer of categories from one world to another. Creative
people working within the fields of popular art and entertainment see
these fields as a battleground between the forces of commercialism and
artistic expression, at the same time as the high art world rejects their
whole field as “not really art.” Yet assimilation of popular art and
entertainment by the fine art world does also occur; and to the extent
that it does, the modern system is taking on some of the character of
that which it assimilates. It is becoming harder to dismiss popular art
and entertainment as “not art.” Quite a few movies, quite a lot of
popular music, quite a few graphic novels, a number of television series
have the strength, originality, depth and imagination to bolster their
claims to be art within the modern system. Yet they are popular, they
are entertainment, they are profitable, they are made for the present
more than for the ages, and they participate in an aesthetic of the
everyday.
Along with the expansion of art categories to the fields of popular art
and entertainment, and the presentation of such work in fine art venues,
we may note the attention that philosophers and critics have recently
been showing to these fields. It is no longer unusual to read criticism of
graphic novels in the New York Times or to see essays on film or rap
music or video games in the leading journals of aesthetics, or to see
graffiti art displayed in galleries.
2) Craftwork
Craftwork is thriving in the West. But this is a different sort of thriving
from that of craftwork in the West before the industrial revolution or in
traditional non-Western cultures. In those settings, craft is necessary for
daily life, and skill and grace tend naturally to be valued in combination
(within affordable limits). In the contemporary West and increasingly in
the rest of the world, craftwork is not valued because it meets everyday
needs but because it is handmade, individual, and different from the
mass-produced ordinary. There is a strong pull to assimilate such work
into the category of Fine Art. One sees advertisements for “Fine Craft”
shows, and every large city gallery district has galleries which specialize
in ceramics, wood turning, fine art furniture, fiber arts, and the like.
Objects are shown, valued and purchased in these galleries in much the
same way that paintings and sculptures are. Consider the example of
“You Da Buddha,” a meditation seat by fine furniture maker Tom Huang.
(This and other pieces by Huang may be viewed
at:www.wexlergallery.com/wexler.htmlClick on Artists, mouse down to
Tom Huang.) This piece sold recently for a total of $5,000. The
craftsmanship is exquisite, combining skills in woodworking and fiber
arts; the object is one of a kind, and its gently ironic blend of humorous
title, price, and obvious functionality give it as much meaning as a fine
art product might need. Huang’s website
(www2.ku.edu/~sfa/dsgn/industrialdesign/huang/index.shtml) describes
his work as “furniture based sculpture”. He is an assistant professor of
industrial design in a school of fine art, and his work was recently
featured in American Craft Magazine. So he crosses the boundaries of
the modern system in several ways. The sale price of $5,000 for this
object is plainly reasonable, given the quality of the piece and the
amount of time invested in the making of it by a highly skilled
professional. As art world prices go, it is on the low side. At that price,
especially after the gallery takes its cut, Huang would have difficulty
making and selling enough such individual pieces in a year to earn his
middle-class salary. He needs his day job. On the other hand, a price of
$5,000 is forbiddingly high for anyone earning less than a solidly middle-
class American income, and thus ironically dissonant with Buddhist ideals
of simplicity and nonattachment. No doubt Huang knows all this, and his
pop-culture title may be reflecting on the fact.
To some extent, the recent flourishing of craftwork in Western culture
represents an extension of the fine art paradigm to cover certain elite
products. A clear example of this is the 2002 name change of New York's
American Museum of Craft to the Museum of Arts and Design. In
announcing the change, the director said "craft" is identified with hobbies
and fairs and the Board president spoke of it as associated with
"trinkets." (I'm indebted to Larry Shiner for this example.) Replicating
the invidious distinctions of the fine art paradigm within the world of
craft in this way may be a regrettable development. But once again,
assimilation of some craft by the modern system has its effect on the
values of that system. For functionality remains a crucial element in
craftwork. This is arguably true even in cases where it might seem not to
be. Craft museums, galleries, and craft shows of the kind that are
gaining fine art status frequently include examples of nonfunctional
objects. Some are innocently non functional: they are sculptures made
from clay, fiber, or wood. Some are "in your face” nonfunctional: the
pitcher with a hole in its side, the impossible-to-drink-from "Hairy
Monster Goblet" I once saw whose body (though not its base or stem)
was entirely covered by extruded glass spines. Such playful items shout
"I, too, am fine art! You want me to be nonfunctional, fine! I'm
nonfunctional! Pin a medal on me, you dope!" But the skill of the maker,
the obvious ability to make items that combine beauty, grace, or
meaning with utility, is always evident. They come from a tradition
where the elegant combination of form with function is highly valued.
Wendell Castle, often credited with founding the modern Fine Art
Furniture movement, provides an excellent example. He makes one-of-
a-kind objects a person might want to display rather than use, but he
also markets the Wendell Castle Collection, which, while a bit pricey,
enables one to outfit one’s living or dining room with some standard
Castle designs (available only through selected galleries). Thus, once
again, the fine art idea has spread, this time into the fields of craft and
commercial production which it was supposed to exclude. But in the
process it is being transformed to include some of those qualities whose
exclusion has helped to define it.
3) Design
Design occupies an interesting and in some ways a contradictory place in
the modern art world. It owes a great deal to the vocabulary of modern
art. It creates and conveys many cultural messages. The symbolic
weight and technical skill of contemporary design work frequently earn it
a place in fine art museums. It is also commercial, if anything is.
Industry, advertising, communication, and mass culture depend heavily
on design for their power, as Stuart Ewen demonstrates in his classic All
Consuming Images: The Politics of Style in Contemporary Culture. [10]
Design shapes us; in a way it gives us the feel of who we are. It can
work together with values we might approve to spread those values
within the culture. The high end of the American office furniture
industry, and the US Green Building Council with its LEED standards, do
this with environmental values in their designs. Design work is skilled
work; one trains for it in art school; one learns it as a craft. In fact, it
regularly embodies the supposedly contradictory values of free creativity
and uniform mass production, since skilled, creative designers are
constantly making new styles that are then rushed to market and sold to
our desire for freedom and individuality. Here, perhaps, an essential
point about the “possibility of a third system” comes unavoidably to the
surface. It is the question of the relationship between change in the
modern system of the arts and change in modern society more
generally. For in spite of their claim to autonomy, the arts are by no
means unconnected with the structures of modern society. I now turn to
that question.
4. Is a Third System of the Arts Possible?
The signs indicate that the modern system is changing. Some of its
distinctions are beginning to break down. Popularity, entertainment
value, and integral functionality are not automatically locking things out
of the art world as effectively as they once did. If these phenomena are
not universal, I believe they are prevalent enough to be significant. At
least for the examples I’ve mentioned, the change seems best
describable as a spread of the fine art idea to fields it was formerly
thought to exclude, along with an expansion of high-culture art-world
attention to popular art, entertainment, craft, and commercial design. As
a result, at least to some degree, functionality, skill and entertainment
value can be seen as positive elements of a work’s aesthetic value. This
is a significant transformation.
Yet it does not seem to me that these changes alone go deep enough to
portend an essential conversion to a new system of the arts. In fact they
are ambiguous. One may also see them as a testimony to the strength
of the underlying structure of the fine art system. Its dynamics have
replicated themselves within the fields of popular music, film, comic
books, craftwork and design. This ability of the system’s dynamics to
spread beyond its original home and to transcend its original limitations
should give us pause, and make us wonder if we have misrecognized its
fundamental character. Paul Mattick has argued persuasively that the
fundamental dynamic of that system is ideological. [11] To the extent
that this is true, transformation of the modern system will require
transformation as well in the organization of society.
One of Shiner’s chapter titles describes the emerging modern system as
“Polite Arts for the Polite Classes.” The title points to the class origins of
the new system, and Shiner gives plenty of evidence for the way this
worked in the eighteenth century. He notes that the original dynamic is
still at work in the newest trend of “craft as art” on which I’ve
commented above (TIA, pp. 274-278). The modern system of the arts is
very tightly intertwined with the economic and class structures of the
modern way of life. Poverty and class identity continue to limit both the
access and the cultural capital necessary to understand and participate
in the elite art world, and thus they continue to define sharp divisions
within the arts, as in the rest of life. Those divisions are not going away;
in one version or another they are replicated in every transformation of
the modern system. “Artistic freedom,” subjective individual genius,
being avant garde and resistant to control are constant themes in
modern art. These qualities are seen as contrasting with the stultifying
forces of “commercialism,” the culture of Kmart and McDonald’s. The
division between the “commercial” and the “authentic” continues to
appear in the values of popular music, the movies, and what I’ve been
calling “fine crafts.”
It seems to me that the freedom they portend is in part genuine and in
part illusory. First, some examples of the genuine: When Jimmy Hendrix
went to Africa and the craze for electric guitar playing spread across that
continent, and again when Paul Simon visited South Africa and made
Graceland, many people feared that traditional African music would be
replaced by repetitive knock-offs of western blues and rock. Nothing of
the sort happened. On the contrary, traditional African musical forms
have survived, flourished, and spread around the world (as Ladysmith
Black Mombazo sang when I heard them at my university, “Thank God
for Paul Simon!”) At the same time, new forms developed which blended
Western influences with African forms to make township jive and other
such new musics, and strongly stimulated the development of “world
music”. The results were unique and wonderful. Art of protest,
resistance, and social commentary provides many other examples of
genuine and often courageous artistic freedom.
In spite of such examples, I think we must recognize the truth of the
point Paul Mattick makes so forcefully. Artistic freedom, in the modern
system, depends significantly on that to which it is opposed. The more
outré the work, the more this rule holds true. The art market depends on
large infusions of money from those same commercial forces, whether
that money passes through the hands of individual buyers of art or is
conveyed directly by corporate purchases and grants. Its freedom does
not pass to the poor. It is not correct to say that the arts are pure
ideology; they are very far from it. But the unique ideas of the modern
system, of art for art’s sake, artistic genius, and the autonomous
aesthetic come very close to being pure ideology. They do so most
effectively, it seems to me, when they are used to divide Art from other
things, and to devalue a product or performance as “not really art.”
5. Conclusion
So where does that leave us? The poor were hardly better off under the
traditional system in the West. Perhaps the question becomes what role
all the arts might play, not only in their own transformation but in that of
society in general. There can be no easy answer to this question. But
one can’t help noticing that electronic media have become remarkably
affordable and are beginning to spread rapidly outside the developed
world. It is no wild fantasy to suggest that they will be increasingly
potent channels for social change. Walter Benjamin’s speculations about
the work of art in the age of mechanical reproducibility seem if anything
more relevant now than they were when he first wrote them. The
possibility does exist within those media for very wide-spread
participation in these arts, not only in listening or viewing but in
production. And Benjamin’s final question remains equally relevant: Will
the forces of human creativity, intercultural communication and freedom
win out, or will these media become primarily agents of propaganda,
commercial interests and the reproduction of the status quo? So long as
we are not looking to the arts alone rather than to all segments of
society for the answers to these questions, it seems clear, at least to
me, that the arts have a crucial contribution to make in our quest. As
one small current example from among the fractured diversity of things
now called art, I point to the performance art of Damali Ayo
http://www.damaliayo.com/ , who has consistently and deliberately
found ways to make her work available to anyone who wants it, outside
the class-defined venues of galleries and exhibitions, through street
performance (e.g., her Panhandling for Reparations project), You-Tube,
and so on.
To sum up: Larry Shiner’s thesis about the nature and origins of the
modern system of the arts is plausible, and survives objections against
it. It deserves to be taken seriously. His speculations about the possible
emergence of a third system of the arts are intriguing, and there are
indeed signs that the modern system is changing in some fundamental
ways. Without a more profound analysis of the current relation of that
system to the dynamics of wealth and class, speculation about a third
system is hard to assess. However, it seems unlikely that a third system
of the arts would be able to emerge, without corresponding changes in
the class and economic structures of the modern world.
Endnotes
[1]Shiner, Larry, The Invention of Art: A Cultural History (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2001).
[2]Kristeller, Paul Oskar, “The Modern System of the Arts,” Journal of
the History of Ideas 12, 1951, 496-527, and 13, 1952, 17-46; reprinted
in Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and the Arts: Collected Essays
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
[3]Bourdieu, Pierre, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of
Taste, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1984); also Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art
and Literature, ed. Randal Johnson (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1993).
[4]Mattick, Paul, Art in its Time: Theories and Practices of Modern
Aesthetics (London and New York: Routledge, 2003).
[5]
Eagleton, Terry, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing, 1990).
[6]In the face of frequent misunderstanding, as well as the fractured
pluralism of contemporary art, Shiner himself has begun to move away
from use of the term “system” to describe what is happening now
(personal communication, 2007). In the sense in which both he and
Kristeller intend it, however, it seems to me that the term continues to
be both appropriate and helpful in picking up the common function of the
terms “art,” “art work,” “artist,” and “aesthetic.” While the argument of
the paper does not hang on it, I have chosen to retain it.
[7]Stephen Davies, though familiar with Shiner’s view, appears to
misunderstand it in this way in his recent text The Philosophy of Art
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006, 1-25). Shiner’s view does not
preclude the existence of human universals (image-making, story-
telling, singing, dancing, music-making) or of other commonalities
among any actual or conceivable systems of the arts.
[8]Whether this value is genuinely independent of these other functions
is quite another matter. Shiner pays some attention to this question,
most especially in his treatment of the origins of the fine art system. It
gets less play in his discussion of contemporary issues, though it is not
absent. See Mattick, op. cit. , for an examination of some of the ways
contemporary art functions socially behind the screen of its supposed
autonomy.
[9]Barlow, Paul, review of Shiner, The Invention of Art and MacDonald,
Exploring Media Discourse in Journal of Visual Culture in Britain, 5.1,
Summer 2003, 105-115, ref. 107.
[10]Ewen, Stuart, All Consuming Images: The Politics of Style in
Contemporary Culture (NY: Basic Books, 1988, 1999).
[11]Mattick, Paul, op. cit.
David Clowney
clowney@rowan.edu
Published December 21, 2008
